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ABSTRACT 
This research assesses the effects of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards in international trade by 
introducing a new concept, bridge to cross (BTC), with product standards. The BTC in this paper is the 
regulatory gap between the exporting and importing countries with regard to any particular SPS measure. 
Assuming that each country’s standard is binding in its own domestic markets, the standard of the 
importing country emerges as an effective trade barrier only when it exceeds the standard in the domestic 
market of the exporting country. Given the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity (multilateral 
resistance) in empirical trade models, if SPS regulations do not vary significantly over time, the effect of 
the regulation cannot be identified. However, the effect of BTC can still be identified because it varies by 
the pair of countries involved in the trade. As an application we apply the method to an SPS regulation 
relating to aflatoxin contamination in maize. In our empirical analysis we find that the effect of BTC 
varies by the size of the exporter and that the effect is stronger for poorer countries. 
Keywords:  sanitary and phytosanitary standards, gravity model, multilateral resistance, bridge to 
cross   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper assesses the effects of nontariff barriers on trade, in particular the sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, countries can choose their 
own SPS standards to protect human, animal, and plant health—along with other objectives such as 
protection of environment—as long as they are nondiscriminatory and can be justified by science. The 
near-perfect sovereignty in choosing SPS measures has meant that several disputes under the SPS and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements have occurred. Yet, a scant literature exists on the 
assessment of the effects of standards on trade, owing to various reasons that have been cited in 
Clougherty and Grajek (2008).  
Several difficulties arise in assessing the impact of standards on trade, the most important being 
measurability, especially in a form that captures the intensity of product standards. Deardorff and Stern 
(1998) list standards as the most difficult nontariff barriers to quantify. The Deardorff and Stern (1998) 
argument has been seconded by several other studies (for example, Laird and Yeats 1990; Maskus, 
Wilson, and Otsuki 2001; Blind 2004; Shepherd 2007). In the absence of a quantifiable measure to 
capture the SPS regulation, most studies use an inventory approach, that is, one that counts the number of 
standards, the number of documents, or the number of import refusals while accessing the export markets 
(Clougherty and Grajek 2008; Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace 2010). This approach is obviously inadequate 
to capture the intensity of product standards across markets.  
An additional data-driven constraint that applies to SPS measures follows from the sluggishness 
in the standards that, once set, tend to change very infrequently. The implication of this is that generally 
there is very little variation over time in the standards to capture their effect on trade. In the reduced-form 
empirical trade models, the now-well-established need to account for unobserved multilateral resistance 
terms requires inclusion of exporter and importer fixed effects. With the inclusion of these fixed effects, 
the effect of any covariate that does not vary either by trading pairs or over time cannot be identified. 
Product standards for a large number of cases tend to fall in this category. National treatment rule under 
the WTO mandates that each importing country apply the same standards to all exporters. This implies 
that importing country regulation, if it does not vary over time, will be subsumed in importer fixed 
effects.  
A handful of papers that have looked at the effects of SPS measures have focused only on 
importing country regulations and used various proxies of SPS measures. Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace 
(2010), for example, show that a greater number of import refusals at the European ports has a negative 
effect on trade flows. While they account for the multilateral resistance in their gravity specification (as 
import refusals vary over time), the nature of their data does not allow accounting for zero trade (import 
refusals can occur only when trade happens), which makes their results susceptible to selection bias. 
Additionally, the number of import refusals is an imperfect measure of the intensity of SPS measures 
because they are driven by several other factors including reputation of the exporter.  
This paper proposes an alternative method for assessing the impacts of product standards by 
introducing a trading-pair-varying measure of product standards in the form of a regulatory gap. The basic 
principle behind this measure of SPS regulation is that the gap between the importing country standards 
and the domestic standards is what determines the burden on the exporters. Since the BTC varies by the 
trading pair, it is amenable to identification in empirical models that include exporter and importer fixed 
effects. Apart from this technical rationale, we argue below that a BTC measure in regulation has an 
intuitive appeal.  
Another empirical challenge in the literature on standards and trade relates to the issue of reverse 
causality (Casella 1996; Blind 2002). The BTC measure as defined is less likely to be subject to such 
concerns. For the bilateral BTC measure to be endogenous, it must be true that changes in pair-specific 
trade flows have an effect on the standard chosen by the exporter, by the importer, or by both and, in turn, 
on BTC. However, such induced change in regulation in one county would affect its BTC with all its 
trading pairs. The fact that standards, even if chosen in response to increases or decreases in trade flows,  
2 
would apply to all countries implies that such induced variation in BTC is not likely to be systematic. 
Thus, suppose any country 𝑗 (exporting or importing country) does change its SPS regulation in response 
to its trade with country 𝑖. This change will affect its BTC not only with country 𝑖 but also with all other 
countries 𝑘 that country 𝑗 trades with. Thus, a systematic causality in the direction from trade flow to 
BTC could be unlikely. 
Our variable of interest in the analysis is thus modified to be the BTC term as distinct from the 
importing country regulation per se. The regulatory gap in effect is what needs to be bridged to get market 
access. Assuming that stricter standards are achieved with higher costs, the costs because of BTC in 
accessing markets will vary positively with the size of the bridge. Moreover, meeting standards often 
imposes both fixed as well as variable costs. Thus, we hypothesize that the effect of a BTC would differ 
by the size of the producers that could be contextually defined.  
This paper is closest to Moenius (2004, 2006), which assess the effect of bilaterally shared and 
country-specific standards. Moenius (2004) focuses on industrial products in 12 countries during the 
period 1980–1995, while in Moenius (2006) the focus is on SPS measures in agricultural trade during the 
same time period. 
The specification in both Moenius papers (2004, 2006) measures harmonized versus country-
specific standards in terms of an indicator variable. Thus, there is no role of exporting country standards 
when the standard is import-country specific (and not harmonized with the exporter). This is in sharp 
contrast to formalization in this paper, where BTC figures in all cases, regardless of whether the standards 
are harmonized. Comparing with the characterization in Moenius (2004, 2006), harmonized standards 
translate to eliminating the regulatory gap, that is, drawing the BTC measure to zero while country-
specific standards could imply either a nonzero BTC for exporting country or a BTC that equals zero 
(when the importing country standard is weaker). Further, as a measure of regulatory barrier, the indicator 
variable for harmonization in these papers cannot capture the intensity when country-specific standards 
exist, but the BTC measure captures the intensity of standardization in all cases. 
Another difference yet is in the identification strategy in this paper, where the variation that is 
being exploited is across trading pairs for the same product. The effects in Moenius (2004, 2006) are also 
identified using pairwise variation, that is, whether the importing and exporting country standards are 
shared or not, but the variation that it used for identification is across different products.  
We apply the method of BTC to the case of regulations related to aflatoxin (a type of mycotoxin) 
contamination in maize to illustrate its applicability.
1 There are several reasons for this choice. Summary 
evidence exists on the market losses following greater stringency of mycotoxin regulations. Thailand, for 
example, was at one time among the world’s leading corn exporters, regularly ranking among the top five 
exporters during the 1970s and 1980s. But partly due to aflatoxin problems, Thai corn regularly sold at a 
discount on international markets, costing Thailand about $50 million per year in lost export value 
(Tangthirasunan 1998). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), the direct costs of mycotoxin contamination of corn and peanuts in Southeast Asia (Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines) amounted to several hundred million dollars annually (Bhat and Vasanthi 
1999). Total peanut meal imports by the European Union (EU) member countries fell from more than one 
million tons in the mid-1970s to just 200,000–400,000 tons annually after 1982, when the mycotoxin 
regulations were tightened in the EU. 
Standards related to aflatoxin contamination are specified in parts per billion and hence represent 
one of the few situations where intensity of the standards is directly measured. Secondly, in the literature 
as well as in policy discourses, the potential of these standards to limit trade is widely discussed (Otsuki, 
Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a, 2001b). In 2001, then Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Anan 
had the following remark on European harmonization of aflatoxin standards, the ex-ante effect of which 
                                                       
1 Aflatoxins are highly toxic metabolites produced by the soilborne fungi Aspergillus flavus that, when in the food supply, 
contribute to developmental delays, morbidity, and mortality in humans and domestic animals. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 25 percent of the world food exports are affected by mycotoxins each 
year (Scholthof 2004).  
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was assessed in Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, 2001b): “A World Bank study has calculated that 
the European Union regulation on aflatoxins costs Africa $750 million each year in exports of cereals, 
dried fruit and nuts. And what does it achieve? It may possibly save the life of one citizen of the European 
Union every two years … Surely a more reasonable balance can be found.”
2  
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a) explored the trade effect of the European Commission 
(EC) proposal to harmonize aflatoxin standards, announced in 1998, that would tighten the average level 
of aflatoxin standards in the EU. It was later implemented in 2002. The paper predicted the trade effect of 
setting aflatoxin standards under three regulatory scenarios: standards set at pre-EU harmonized levels 
(status quo), the harmonized EU standard adopted across Europe, and a standard set by the Codex.
3 Their 
findings suggested that the trade of nine African countries would potentially decline by $400 million 
under the proposed stringent new EU standards, whereas this trade would have increased by $670 million 
had the EU based its new harmonized standards on Codex guidelines that were less stringent. A second 
study, focusing only on edible groundnut exports from Africa by the same authors, estimated that the new 
EU standard for aflatoxin would result in an 11 percent decline in EU imports from Africa and a trade 
flow some 63 percent lower than it would have been had the Codex standards been adopted (Otsuki, 
Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001b).  
Since the publication of these papers, two main developments have occurred in the evolution of 
the gravity model of trade. The first development relates to the analysis in Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003), who showed that trade costs had to be measured as a “multilateral resistance” term as opposed to 
a bilateral cost. This term was reflected in exporter and importer price indexes (in fact an ideal price index 
of composite goods).  
The second major development was regarding the issue of zero trade in empirical analysis. Note 
that both at the product level and at the aggregate level some countries do not trade with each other on a 
sustained basis. Following Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), gravity models of 
international trade have been derived that can accommodate the presence of zero trade flows between 
countries.  
We believe such a framework that incorporates zero trade is a clear improvement in empirical 
analysis of trade flows. Hence, the empirical model that we use for estimation is based on Melitz (2003); 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008); and Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2010), all of which consider 
the fixed costs of exporting. In our case we assume that the level of these costs of exporting vis-à-vis 
aflatoxin regulations is a function of the level of the regulation.  
We find that the effects that are obtained in log linear ordinary least squares specifications as in 
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, 2001b) mostly disappear when accounting for multilateral 
resistance (exporter and importer hetereogeneity), sample selection, and zero trade. We also find that 
accounting for zero trade is important and that significant selection bias can occur if zero trade is not 
accounted for. We think of BTC to be more detrimental for the smaller producers because it directly 
affects the bilateral fixed costs of exporting.  
Our BTC measure, particularly its interaction with a measure of producer size, shows that 
regulatory gap is an important factor in explaining the effect of SPS measure on trade flows for smaller 
producers. We explore the effect of our BTC measure that varies by the size of the producers in three 
subsamples: global sample, poor country sample, and a sample of African countries. Compared with the 
global sample, the effects of the BTC variable are greater in the poor and African countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the methodology for estimating the 
effect of SPS measures as a bridge to cross. Section 3 presents details on data and descriptive statistics 
related to these data. Section 4 presents the results of regression analysis, and Section 5 concludes and 
provides the possible policy implications.  
                                                       
2 Kofi Anan (2001) – UN conference on Least Developed Economies, 2001. 
3 In addition, the authors examined the trade-off between human health and trade flows for each of these three regulatory 
scenarios based on risk assessment studies.  
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2.  METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING EFFECTS  
The basic specification in this paper for assessing the effects of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
standards on trade is presented as a two-stage Heckman estimation process as given in equations (1) and 
(2),  
  ij ij ij ij j i ij BTC H T ε ϕ ρ τ π γ + + + + + + = θ Z 1 ,  (1) 
  ij ij ij ij ij j i ij BTC size producer  BTC X ε µ ϑ β α τ π γ + + + ∗ + + + + = θ Z } ) ( { 2 ,  (2) 
where  it T  is a binary variable that equals 1 if the maize exports from country  j  to country i  is nonzero 
and equals 0 otherwise, and  ij X  is the value of export from country  j  to country i . The intercepts are 
1 γ  and  2 γ ; the importer and exporter fixed effects are  i π  and  j τ , respectively;  ij Z  is a vector of pair-
varying controls such as bilateral distance and other measures of trade costs (for example, common 
border, common language, whether or not the trading partners belong to the World Trade Organization, 
whether or not the two countries belong to the same legal origin, and partnerships in a preferential trading 
arrangement);  ij H is the exclusion variable that does not enter the second-stage regression (more on this 
later in the paper); and  ij µ  is the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage. Note that the importer and 
exporter fixed effects control for multilateral resistance and are likely determinants of both propensity to 
export as well as the actual value of realized exports. Furthermore, the selection equation also includes the 
pair-varying bridge to cross (BTC) variable.  
The first stage of the regression models whether or not countries trade with each other is specified 
as a probit regression. The second stage models the value of trade flows, taking into account the selection 
into trading captured in the first stage (by adding the inverse Mills ratio as one of the regressors in the 
second stage).  
We test two versions of the second-stage regression of nonzero trade: one with the BTC variable 
and the other that includes an interaction between BTC and the size of the producer. As a measure of size 
we use a binary variable that indicates whether the cultivated maize area as a proportion of a country’s 
agrarian population is less than that of the global median of the same variable. In other words, the variable 
indicates if the exporter is a small producer. If fixed costs are to be incurred that are monotonic with the 
size of BTC, the marginal effect of BTC can be hypothesized to be greater for the smaller producers. A 
negative and significant sign on the coefficient β  would imply that a given BTC is more detrimental to 
the smaller producers and exporters.
4 
As for the excluded variable, it is challenging to find variables that are highly correlated with a 
country’s propensity to export and not significantly correlated with the actual levels of exports.
5 Our 
exclusion variable is the historical frequency of nonzero trade ( ij H ), that is, a proportion of years in a 
moving window that the two countries traded with each other. Thus, for 1995, the historical frequency of 
positive trade for any trading pairs will be given by the proportion of years in the five-year window 
                                                       
4 Note that the size variable does not appear in the regressions other than in the interaction because it is subsumed in the 
exporter fixed effect due to lack of variation over time. 
5 Finding an exclusion variable in the context of trade flows is extremely difficult. Most variables that affect whether or not 
two countries trade are also likely to affect the amount of trade between them. It can be argued that some of the exclusion 
variables that have been used in the literature suffer from this problem. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), in their 
pioneering work on deriving the empirical specifications of the gravity model from theory, use common religion as an exclusion 
variable. But common religion, like common language, can reduce trade costs and hence affect both the outcomes—that is, 
whether a pair of countries trade or not—and the value of trade that is realized.  
5 
beginning 1988 that nonzero trade occurred. Subsequently, for 1996, the window would start in 1989. The 
premise is that the higher the frequency of positive trade in the past, the greater the likelihood of two 
countries having a nonzero trade flow in the current period. This fraction of positive trade in the past 
moreover can be argued to affect the likelihood of trade but not necessarily the current level of trade 
flows. 
Equations (1) and (2) are thus a standard gravity model, at the product or sector level. Estimation 
of trade flows with a gravity model is usually subject to two kinds of biases (Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein 2008). The first is the standard sample selection problem in a regression such as in equation 
(2), where the sample of nonzero exports is nonrandom. The Heckman correction through the inclusion of 
the inverse Mills ratio as a regressor in the second stage has been employed for addressing this bias in the 
coefficients in the second stage.  
Another bias that relates to the extensive margins in trade, where not accounting for the number 
of firms exporting within an industry, results in omitted variable bias (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 
2008). The number of firms exporting is jointly determined by the bilateral fixed costs of exporting and 
the productivity distribution of firms. Owing to the fixed costs, only firms with a level of productivity 
beyond a threshold end up exporting. In our setting, SPS standard and by extension the BTC would 
directly result in introducing fixed costs in exporting and thereby affect the extensive margin of trade. In 
models like Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz, with fixed costs of exporting, the size of the extensive margin of 
trade, however, is a direct function of the elasticity of substitution across varieties in a sector that tends to 
be high in agriculture.  
Belenkiy (2009) decomposes the biases in gravity models in the manufacturing, mining, and 
agriculture industries and shows that the extensive margin correction bias in standard gravity models does 
not hold uniformly across all industries. In agriculture, characterized by high elasticity of substitution 
between the exported varieties, the extensive margin correction is not a significant determinant of trade 
flows. At the same time, Belenkiy (2009) finds that the nonrandom selection (Heckman) correction is 
significant in agricultural exports. The estimation strategy in equations (1) and (2) is in line with these 
findings. 
Finally, note that the identification strategy for the effects on trade is based on exploiting cross-
sectional trading pairwise variation. Recall that standards tend to be sluggish over time. For this reason 
our BTC measure also has low intertemporal variation (though possibly more than country-specific 
standards per se), but there is significant variation in BTC across trading pairs. By treating each 
observation for a trading pair at different points in time as a unique entry, only bilateral variables such as 
distance or BTC can be identified. All other variables that are exporter- or importer-specific (gross 
domestic product, for example) get subsumed in the fixed effects even if they vary over time. This 
identification strategy is identical to Helpman, Melitz and Rubeinstein(2008) and Manova (2006), where 
the effect of distance is to be identified.   
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3.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As discussed above, we chose to study aflatoxin regulation because of its uniqueness as a continuous 
measure of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. Maize trade is chosen because it is one of the 
most highly traded staples in the world, both as food as well as feed. Maize is moreover highly prone to 
mycotoxin (including aflatoxin) contamination, and regulations apply to both food and feed trade. Wu 
(2008) points out that the issue of mycotoxins has been historically observed for a long time but the real 
recognition came from the 1960 discovery of aflatoxins in the United Kingdom that resulted in the deaths 
of 100,000 turkeys. Wu (2008) further points out that now several dozen mycotoxins have been identified. 
This paper focuses only on aflatoxins, which has drawn the maximum attention with regard to food 
safety. The SPS regulations related to food and feed in aflatoxin contamination, however, are different 
among countries, and in some cases quite significantly. In the analysis in this paper we do account for this 
distinction. 
According to Dohlman (2003), food contaminated with mycotoxins, and particularly with 
aflatoxins, can cause acute illness that is sometimes fatal and are associated with increased cancer risk. 
Dohlman (2003) further states that diverging perceptions of tolerable health risks—associated largely 
with a nation’s level of economic development and susceptibility of crops to contamination—have led to 
widely varying standards among different national or multilateral agencies. Considering a set of 48 
countries with established limits for total aflatoxins in food, Dohlman (2003) states that standards varied 
widely, ranging from 0 to 50 parts per billion. 
This paper uses secondary data from several sources. Data on maize trade flows is obtained from 
United Nations Comtrade database. Agricultural trade is often subject to seasonal fluctuations. We 
therefore average the data over eight years to control for the possibility of abnormal trade flows. 
The level of mycotoxin regulations is obtained from two publications from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) titled Worldwide Regulations for Mycotoxins in 
Food and Feed—one in 1995 (FAO 1997) and the other in 2003 (FAO 2004). The data on the regulations 
were from the responses to queries that were sent to different governments. Note that some countries in 
the dataset at some points followed the Codex standard.
6 For those countries, the Codex standard relevant 
for that period was assigned to the countries. Also, a good number of low-income countries do not have 
any official mycotoxin regulations. Another set of countries includes those that did not respond to the 
query sent by FAO/WHO (World Health Organization). The regulation data are missing for these 
countries and hence we do not include them in our sample.  
As discussed above, even though the aflatoxin regulations constitute a continuous measure of 
regulation (as opposed to count measures in inventory approaches), the construction of the SPS measure 
as a trade barrier needs some explanation. The aflatoxin regulations are specified as permissible limits in 
terms of parts per billion or micrograms per kilogram. Suppose the permissible limit in country i is  i µ . 
We define the regulation in country i  to equal  ) 1 ( i µ ; that is, the smaller the permissible limit of 
contamination, the tighter the standard. We then assign a value equal to 0 for countries that have reported 
to the FAO/WHO inquiry stating that they do not have any restriction on the permissible limits. Defined 
in this way, our regulation variable takes a value between 0 and 1 (with 1 being the lowest permissible 
limit in parts per billion in the data and the most stringent regulation, and 0 depicting the weakest 
regulation). There is significant variation in the data on regulation; see the example of a few countries in 
Table 3.1. 
   
                                                       
6 The Codex standard is specified only for the aggregate level of mycotoxins and not specifically aflatoxins. Assuming a 60 
percent share of aflatoxins in total mycotoxins, the level employed is  kg g µ 6 .  
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Table 3.1—Aflatoxin standards in select countries, 2003 
Country/Region  Aflatoxins limit in human food  
(parts per billion) 
Standard regulation  
defined in the paper 
Australia  5  0.2 
China  20  0.05 
European Union  4*  0.25 
Guatemala  20  0.05 
India  30  0.03 
United States  20  0.05 
Source: Wu and Bryden (2009). 
Notes: * applies to cereals and cereal products, nuts not subject to further processing and dried fruit. 
Moreover, the stringency of regulations in different countries has changed over time. The 
European Union (EU) harmonized their regulation in 2002. After that, as new members joined the EU, 
they were required to apply the regulation that existed per the harmonized regulations. Table 3.2 shows 
when the new members joined the EU, which has a bearing on the regulations that would be applied. In 
our five-year slabs, this factor is particularly important for countries joining the EU in 2004. In the Czech 
Republic, for example, the permissible limits on aflatoxins went down to 2, from 5 when it was not a 
member of the EU. Hence, both the harmonization of standards in 2002 as well as entry of new members 
into the EU implies that globally the average level of regulation related to aflatoxins increased. Since our 
data on trade flows is until 2008, we do not make adjustments for Bulgaria and Romania in the dataset.  
Table 3.2—Changing composition of the block with the toughest aflatoxins regulation 
Original  
EU members  
Members joining 
May 1, 2004  January 1, 2007 
Austria  Czech Republic  Bulgaria 
Belgium  Cyprus  Romania 
Denmark  Estonia   
Finland  Hungary   
France  Latvia   
Germany  Lithuania   
Greece  Malta   
Ireland  Poland   
Italy  Slovakia   
Luxembourg  Slovenia   
The Netherlands     
Portugal     
Spain     
United Kingdom      
Source: European Commission.  
Apart from the regulation in the importing country, our modified SPS measure captures a bridge 
to cross (BTC) in terms of the regulatory gap. The regulatory gap is the difference in the aflatoxins 
standard between the importing country and the exporting country. The rationale for BTC is that costs 
have to be incurred to meet the domestic standards, and therefore the extra costs in exports is taken to be a 
function of the gap that needs to be bridged to meet the cutoff. In construction of the BTC variable we 
follow the scheme as given in Table 3.3, which lists the combination of possible scenarios regarding the 
regulatory situation in the exporting and importing countries and the corresponding BTC that it leads to.   
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Table 3.3—Scheme for construction of bridge to cross (BTC) based on regulatory gap 
Regulation in 




√  ×  = 0 
×  √  = import country standard 
√  √  = (importer standard – exporter standard) if difference > 0  
= 0, if difference ≤0 
×  ×  = 0 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Note: (×) denotes no regulation, (√) denotes presence of regulation. 
The bridge as defined in Table 3.3 has the following features. It equals zero if the exporting and 
importing countries have the same standard, including no regulation. In situations where the importing 
country has a regulation but the exporting country has no regulation, we define the importing country 
standard as the bridge. Finally, in other cases it is the difference between the importing and exporting 
country standards with the provision that the bridge is zero if the importing country has a laxer standard 
than the exporter. The BTC measure constructed like this increases with the stringency of the standard in 
the importing country relative to the exporting country and is bound between 0 and 1.  
The BTC variable as constructed has the feature of capturing the benefits of the harmonization of 
standards between the exporting and importing countries as in Moenius (2004) and other papers. At the 
same time, the BTC variable mitigates the problem in harmonization measures where an even lower 
standard in the importing country would imply a barrier as long as it is more stringent than the one in the 
exporting country. While this characterization of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) agreement could 
be plausible in some cases (mainly where standards impose horizontal differentiation, that is, not high or 
low standards but different standards; for example, left-side drive versus right-side drive vehicles), it is 
certainly not suitable in most SPS measures. In SPS measures, the more stringent the regulation, the 
higher the cost of compliance and consequently the greater the trade barrier in effect. In this situation, we 
would argue that BTC is the logical measure for capturing the effect of SPS regulations on trade.  
An important point to note particularly in maize trade is the distinction between food and feed 
maize. A large portion of global trade in maize is in fact as feed. The regulations between maize as food 
and as feed are different in all countries that report permissible limits. In the feed category, regulations 
vary as well. For example, feed for very young animals are often subject to a tighter regulation than feed 
for matured animals. We choose the weakest regulation among feed for the importing country where 
available.  
The Comtrade data do not make a distinction between the two types of maize. Since the maize 
trade flow data are aggregated between food and feed, it is difficult to say what the relevant regulation is 
for recorded trade. In the absence of such a distinction in the trade flows data, we draw from FAOSTAT, 
the FAO agricultural and food database, which gives the share of maize production for food and for feed 
in most countries. We have no way of dividing the trade into food and feed components and to subject 
them to different standards; therefore, we create a new regulation variable by taking a weighted average 
of regulation for food and for feed, where the weight is the food-to-feed ratio in the country. 
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the ln(BTC) variable for countries where the variable takes a 
nonzero value. Since  ] 1 , 0 ( BTC∈ , ln(BTC) plotted in Figure 3.1 takes on negative values. The 
frequency of country pairs is high with bigger regulatory gaps, which comes from a large set of countries 
with notifications of no regulation.   
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Figure 3.1—Distribution of ln (BTC) 
 
Source: Based on mycotoxins regulation data. 
In our empirical analysis we are interested in effects across three samples, namely, global, low-
income exporters, and African countries. Note that given the two-stage specification, the sample in the 
second-stage regression is much smaller because it includes only nonzero exports. Table 3.4 presents the 
summary statistics from the data. A large number of bilateral pairs do not involve trade in maize. 
Globally, 24 percent of trading pairs have maize trade, but only 18 percent and 14 percent in the case of 
poor countries and African exporters, respectively. 
Table 3.1—Summary statistics for maize sample 
All countries 
Full sample (N=17,038)  Nonzero trade (N=4055) 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Proportion of sample with nonzero trade  0.238  0.426  1.000  0.000 
Bilateral maize trade (in 1,000 US deflated dollars)  1,191.988  25,712.250  5,008.408  52,528.540 
Historical frequency of nonzero maize trade   1.296  3.146  5.129  4.625 
Regulation index of importing countries  0.126  0.140  0.135  0.120 
Regulation index of exporting countries  0.134  0.165  0.140  0.151 
Pairwise bridge to cross (BTC)  –4.817  2.364  –4.973  2.290 
Agricultural area  38,625.230  90,985.400  76,446.630  132,727.700 
Agricultural population  21,989.010  104,285.900  45,580.140  165,245.200 
Low income (poor) exporters 
Full sample (N=10,681)  Nonzero trade (N=1,965) 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Proportion of sample with nonzero trade  0.184  0.387  1.000  0.000 
Bilateral maize trade (in 1,000 US deflated dollars)  468.399  7,011.131  2,546.043  16,186.780 
Historical frequency of nonzero maize trade   0.822  2.444  4.243  4.197 
Regulation index of importing countries
a  0.115  0.153  0.118  0.135 
Regulation index of exporting countries  0.134  0.165  0.139  0.150 
Pairwise bridge to cross (BTC)
b  –4.607  2.389  –4.656  2.348 
Agricultural area  38,277.520  82,482.410  88,586.640  135,096.400 




Full sample (N=3,210)  Nonzero trade (N=447) 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Proportion of sample with nonzero trade  0.139  0.346  1.000  0.000 
Bilateral maize trade (in 1,000 U.S. deflated dollars)  128.435  2,355.873  922.317  6,260.972 
Historical frequency of nonzero maize trade   0.518  1.813  3.416  3.638 
Regulation index of importing countries  0.103  0.107  0.122  0.081 
Regulation index of exporting countries  0.134  0.165  0.129  0.110 
Pairwise bridge to cross (BTC)  –4.595  2.410  –4.944  2.346 
Agricultural area  26,306.530  26,063.830  42,521.290  38,521.190 
Agricultural population  13,460.540  10,550.660  13,975.880  9,060.063 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: (a) The regulation indexes are calculated as weighted average of regulation for food and feed, where the weight is the 
proportion of food to feed production ratio. Also, these indices have the range 0.001 to 1. (b) The BTC variable is in log. The 
range of this variable is –6.908 to –0.001. 
According to FAO (2006), the structure of the world maize market can be characterized as one 
with a high level of concentration in terms of exports but very low concentration on the import side. The 
main reason for this is that few countries usually have a significant maize surplus for exports, while many 
rely on international markets to meet their needs mostly for domestic animal feeding purposes by 
importing maize, a primary feed ingredient (FAO 2006). The United States is the world’s largest maize 
exporter and accounts for roughly 60 percent of the global share (in 2006), down from more than 70 
percent a decade ago, followed by Argentina and China. Brazil, the Republic of South Africa, and 
Ukraine are among a few other countries that often have surplus for exports. 
On the side of nontariff measures, regulatory gap (BTC) is our main variable of interest. The 
regulation regarding permissible limits is on average weakest in Africa, followed by other poor countries 
relative to the world as a whole. On a worldwide basis, at least 99 countries had mycotoxin regulations for 
food, feed, or both in 2003—an increase of approximately 30 percent compared with 1995. In fact, in 
2003 , all countries with mycotoxin regulations have regulatory limits at least for Aflatoxin B1 or the sum 
of Aflatoxins B1, B2, G1, and G2 (other mycotoxins) in food, feed, or both .  
The number of countries regulating mycotoxins has significantly increased over the years. Only 
15 African countries have any regulation. Thus, in terms of the BTC, to meet the regulation of the trading 
partner, poor countries in general and particularly in Africa have longer bridges to cross vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. Note that African countries have on average nearly equal bridges to cross as other poor 
country exporters (Table 3.4). 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present the exports of maize from low- and middle-income countries and 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. For brevity, the figures for least-developed countries are not presented here; but 
the pattern is that the relatively well-off nations export to both poor and rich countries, while the poorer 
countries are confined mostly to exporting to low- and middle-income economies. Thus, on the intensive 
margin, the poor exporters have a small BTC, but taking into account the lost trade, the effect of BTC 
could be higher for poorer countries.   
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Figure 3.2—Maize exports of low- and middle-income economies (exports in thousand US dollars,  
y axis) 
. 
Source: UN Comtrade data. 
Figure 3.3—Maize exports of Sub-Saharan African countries (exports in thousand US dollars, 
y axis) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade data.  
In addition to the variables related to the maize sector, several trade and other economic variables 
were used in the analysis. Several of those variables were obtained from the World Development 
Indicators publication of the World Bank. The distance between the trading partners and whether or not 
countries share a common border have also been obtained from the CEPII dataset. Similar pairwise 
variables include shared ethnicity; colonial link or heritage; whether the pair contains both landlocked 
countries, both coastal countries, both with the same legal origin, and both in a currency union; and, 
finally, whether the countries are involved in a conflict with each other at a particular time. The tariff data 
for maize in different countries are obtained from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database.   
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4.  RESULTS 
Linear Effects of Bridge to Cross by Size 
It is important to start the analysis with a naïve empirical model of trade, building upon which we can 
show the importance of the modifications that we bring to the analysis. There is an additional reason for 
bringing forth the discussion of a naïve gravity model of trade to assess the effects of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations. The Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a) paper on trade-inhibiting 
effects of SPS regulations that received a lot of attention in the press (see the discussion above), and 
subsequently also in the literature (with more than 40 citations), was based on the naïve empirical model 
of trade. For the sake of completeness, we replicate the specification in Otsuki et al. (2001a) to highlight 
the possibilities of under- or overestimating the effects of SPS regulations. Note that in this paper as well 
as in several others, the variable of interest is importing country regulation per se. Table 4.1 shows the 
results of the regressions with the importing country regulation as the control variable, once without 
accounting for multilateral resistance and zero trade flows and then again accounting for these factors. 
Accounting for sample selection makes a significant difference to the estimated effect of importing 
country regulation on trade. All these factors motivate our selection of BTC as the variable of interest in a 
framework that accounts for multilateral resistance, sample selection, and firm heterogeneity. 
Table 4.1—Coefficient of importer regulation in gravity equation estimations 
  Wilson–Otsuki (2001a) 
specification 
Two-stage with a selection in the first stage 
(2)  (3) 
Global sample  0.00447  –0.00438  0.0560 
(0.0369)  (0.0322)  (0.108) 
Poor country exporters  0.0617  –0.0361  0.233 
(0.0513)  (0.0461)  (0.173) 
African country exporters  0.0689  –0.0414  0.473 
  (0.0858)  (0.0790)  (0.350) 
Importer fixed effect  no  no  yes 
Exporter fixed effect  no  no  yes 
Other controls and constant  Colonial ties, bilateral 
distance, GDP exporter, 
GDP importer, time 
dummies 
Pair varying control 
variables , GDP of 





Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: (a) Pair-varying control variables include all the pair-varying variables listed in this table. (b) Gross domestic product 
(GDP) exporter, GDP importer, time dummies. (c) The coefficient is that of log of importer regulation. (d) Terms in parentheses 
denote standard errors. 
The results from the two-step Heckman estimation of equations (1) and (2) for the global sample 
are presented in Table 4.2. Our variable of interest is the interaction between the size measure and 
bilateral bridge to cross (BTC). A negative and significant coefficient on this variable means that BTC 
has an effect on trade flows that varies by the size of the exporters. 
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Table 4.2—Global sample regression results 




Bridge-to-cross (BTC)  0.00696  0.00803   
  (0.0143)  (0.0316)   
Interaction (Size xBTC)      –0.0796* 
      (0.0426) 
Share common border (yes=1, no=0)  0.476***  1.321***  1.340*** 
  (0.164)  (0.189)  (0.188) 
Trading pair ethnic–language commonality  0.254***  0.337**  0.337** 
  (0.0640)  (0.147)  (0.148) 
Trading pair has colonial ties  0.255*  –0.128  –0.113 
  (0.151)  (0.249)  (0.247) 
Both countries are landlocked  –5.916***  3.199  2.811 
  (0.390)  (2.464)  (2.701) 
Both countries have coasts  5.874***  –2.220  –1.822 
  (0.347)  (2.447)  (2.686) 
Same legal structure   0.150***  0.210**  0.215** 
  (0.0441)  (0.100)  (0.101) 
Trading pair belong to a currency union  –0.289  1.883***  1.870*** 
  (0.241)  (0.318)  (0.316) 
Trading pair has a history of conflict  0.294  –0.176  –0.202 
  (0.298)  (0.383)  (0.378) 
Trading pair in GATT/WTO  0.139  1.428***  1.404*** 
  (0.141)  (0.346)  (0.351) 
log (bilateral distance)  –0.559***  –1.269***  –1.252*** 
  (0.0319)  (0.0792)  (0.0796) 
Historical frequency of trade  0.626***     
  (0.0176)     
IMR    –1.536***  –1.536*** 
    (0.0995)  (0.103) 
Time-cluster fixed effect  yes  yes  yes 
Exporter fixed effect  yes  yes  yes 
Importer fixed effect  yes  yes  yes 
N  17,038  17,038  4,055 
 R-square  .  0.745  0.745 
 MSE  .  2.565  2.564 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Note: Each regression includes a constant. GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. IMR- Inverse Mills Ratio, 
MSE=Root Mean Square Error, 
Table 4.3 shows the results of regressions for various subsamples. The exclusion of the United 
States in the global sample and of South Africa in a sample of African countries is important because both 
of these countries have a highly disproportionate share of exports in the respective samples. Results show 
that the effect of the BTC measure interacted with size is larger for poor countries, as expected. In fact, 
the effect is the highest for Africa (in a sample that excludes South Africa). Note that the framework takes 
into account zero trade; hence, even if Africa does not have significant maize trade with countries that 
have stringent regulation, the effect of the BTC variable in restraining market entry is accounted for.  
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Table 4.3—Regressions on subsamples 
 
Global sample  
without United States  Poor countries  African countries  Africa  






nd stage with 
interaction 
2
nd stage with 
BTC 
2
nd stage with 
interaction 
2
nd stage with 
BTC 
2
nd stage with 
interaction 
2
nd stage with 
BTC 
2





(0.0326)   
0.0339 
(0.0499)   
–0.0742 
(0.102)   
–0.0953 
(0.110)   
Interaction 
(Size*BTC)   
–0.0805* 
(0.0433)   
–0.119** 
(0.0552)   
–0.156 




variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
IMR  –1.569***  –1.568***  –1.766***  –1.766***  –1.324***  –1.312***  –1.293***  –1.290*** 
  (0.102)  (0.105)  (0.149)  (0.157)  (0.327)  (0.375)  (0.322)  (0.378) 
Time-cluster 
fixed effect  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Exporter fixed 
effect  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Importer fixed 
effect  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
N  16,850  3,873  10,681  1,965  3,210  447  3,022  318 
R-square  0.713  0.714  0.699  0.700  0.695  0.697  0.689  0.694 
MSE  2.592  2.590  2.770  2.767  2.672  2.665  2.402  2.383 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: Each regression has a selection equation that has not been reported and is available upon request, each regression includes a constant and the pair-varying variables are the 
same as listed in Table 4.2. 
  
 
In terms of the quantitative effects, a 1 percent increase in the BTC variable for the exporting 
country with below-median-size producers in the relevant sample decreases trade by 0.08, 0.12, and 0.22 
percent in the global (with or without the United States), poor country, and African exporter (without 
South Africa) samples, respectively. Just to put these figures into perspective, for small producers, the 
effect of the bilateral measure of BTC in the global sample is about 6 percent of the effect of distance (7 
percent without the United States) while it is 10 percent and 17 percent in poor countries and African 
countries (without South Africa), respectively. 
Allowing for Nonlinear Effects of Size and BTC Interaction 
In the specification above, where the BTC variable interacted with a size measure is postulated to have an 
effect on trade flows, the nature of the effect is modeled as linear. Thus, a very high BTC and a very low 
BTC are treated in a symmetric fashion in terms of their effects on trade flows. In reality it is possible that 
the effects are more pronounced for cases of high rather than low BTC, particularly in a framework where 
the option of not trading exists. Thus, for a very high BTC, exporters might not find it worthwhile to trade 
any amount. In general, the effects of BTC on trade could vary nonlinearly even along the intensive 
margin.  
We thus break the BTC variable into two categories: (1) above the 50th percentile of BTC and (2) 
below the 50th percentile of BTC. We then introduce two interactions in the first- and second-stage 
regressions. In the first case, the interaction of the size measure is with below 50th percentile of BTC, 
while in the second case it is with above 50th percentile of BTC. A priori we expect the size of the effect 
to be larger for high-BTC cases. Again, for brevity we present only the coefficients of interaction terms in 
the second stage in Table 4.4. The results in Table 4.4 confirm that this is the case for the global sample 
with and without the United States, for the samples of poor countries, and for the sample of African 
exporters without South Africa. 














Size*(low BTC)  –0.0944**  –0.0984**  –0.141**  –0.184  –0.259** 
  (0.0449)  (0.0456)  (0.0576)  (0.116)  (0.116) 
Size*(high BTC)  –0.168*  –0.188**  –0.255**  –0.294  –0.411* 
  (0.0946)  (0.0958)  (0.116)  (0.250)  (0.239) 
Pair varying variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
IMR  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time-cluster fixed effect  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Exporter fixed effect  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Importer fixed effect  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
N  4,055  3,873  1,965  447  318 
R-square  0.745  0.714  0.700  0.697  0.695 
MSE  2.564  2.590  2.766  2.668  2.384 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: (a) Each regression has a selection equation that has not been reported and is available upon request. (b) Each regression 
includes a constant. (c) The pair-varying variables are the same as listed in Table 4.2.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we introduced the concept of a bridge to cross (BTC) for estimating the effects of sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations measures. Our gravity model specification accommodates the 
requirements demanded by the recent developments in the literature to overcome biased estimates. We 
apply the proposed method to aflatoxin regulations to illustrate an application.  
With the proper specification of the gravity model and improved data, we find evidence that the 
BTC measure interacted with the size of the producer does have a significant effect on trade flows. We 
further find that the effects not only vary by the size of the producers but are also larger in poorer 
countries and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
We would like to argue that although importing country regulation can be a rigid policy measure 
for the exporting country, the regulatory gap could be an actionable variable for the exporting country. 
This is so because an effective regulatory gap contains the domestic standard as well. In many countries, 
mainly developing countries, the two diverge; and consequently the burden of the regulatory gap is 
enhanced. In many poor countries de facto standards could be much less stringent in practice and BTC 
could in effect be higher.  
Our idea of BTC thus has somewhat different policy implications than studies that focus on 
importing country regulation, the effects of which we have argued in general are difficult to identify. 
Even though importing country standards may not be altered, altering the size of the bridge by varying the 
regulation in domestic markets of exporting countries could bring in benefits. Improving domestic 
standards (in line with the health and other benefits) could thus be one prescription for countries to reduce 
the effective barrier from SPS measures. 
We have proposed the idea in terms of the regulatory gap with regard to contaminants or 
pollutants. In these cases, a modified BTC as a gap between contamination and regulation could also be 
considered. The benefits could be clear in terms of reduced contamination—many countries, given their 
contamination levels, have a very long bridge to cross, implying that those exporters do not find it 
worthwhile to incur the costs of crossing the bridge and then exporting. To the extent that contaminations 
in an exporting country are a function of the prevailing standards, the BTC as a regulatory gap would 
overlap with the BTC in terms of the regulation–contamination gap.  
With fixed costs and product standards as trade barriers (modeled here as a bridge to cross), there 
are implications for the true costs of protection along the lines of Roemer (1994). Standards invoke 
bridges to cross because costs need to be incurred to scale the regulatory gaps. In a world that loves 
variety, varieties operating near the margin would be thrown off the market as BTC becomes prohibitive. 
The welfare loss could thus be augmented through loss in the number of available varieties. The varieties 
that will drop off are likely to be from smaller producers. Hence, only if standards bring in strong gains 
could the welfare loss from binding BTC (through reduced varieties) outweigh the benefits.   
17 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, J. E., and E. van Wincoop. 2003. “Gravity with Gravitas.” American Economic Review 93 (1): 170–192. 
Baylis, K., L. Nogueira, and K. Pace. 2010. “Food Import Refusals: Evidence from the European Union.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 91 (5): 1477-1483. 
Belenkiy, M. E. 2009. Robustness of the Extensive Margin in the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (HMR) Model. 
Munich Personal Repec Archive Paper. Munich, Germany: University Library of Munich. 
Bhat, R., and S. Vasanthi. 1999. “Mycotoxin Contamination of Foods and Feeds: Overview, Occurrence and 
Economic Impact on Food Availability, Trade, Exposure of Farm Animals and Related Economic Losses.” 
Third Joint FAO/WHO/UNEP International Conference on Aflatoxins, Tunis, Tunisia, March 3–6. 
Blind, K. 2002. “Driving Forces for Standardization at Development Organizations.” Applied Economics 34 (16): 
1985–1998. 
________. 2004. The Economics of Standards: Theory, Evidence and Policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Casella, A. 1996. “Free Trade and Evolving Standards.” In Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free 
Trade?, edited by B. Jagdish and R. Hudec, 119–156. Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. 
CEPII. 2010. Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International. International Trade Database at the Product Level. 
Accessed January 2011. Available at www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm .   
Clougherty, J. A., and M. Grajek. 2008. “The Impact of ISO 9000 Diffusion on Trade and FDI: A New Institutional 
Analysis.” Journal of International Business Studies 39 (4): 613–633. 
Deardorff, A. V., and R. M. Stern. 1998. Measurement of Nontariff Barriers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Djankov S., C. Freund, and C. Pham. 2010. “Trading on Time.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (1): 
166–173. 
Dohlman, E. 2003. “Mycotoxin Hazards and Regulations: Impacts on Food and Animal Feed Crop Trade.” In 
International Trade and Food Safety: Economic Theory and Case Studies, edited by J. Buzby, 1-2. 
Agricultural Economic Report 828. Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Agriculture . 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer828/. 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2004.Worldwide Regulations for Mycotoxins in Food and Feed in 2003. 
Food and Nutrition Paper 81. Rome, Italy: FAO. 
.________2006. Maize: International Market Profile. Report of the Grains Team Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations Economic and Social Department Trade and Markets Division. 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 1997. Worldwide Regulations for Mycotoxins 1995, A Compendium. 
Food and Nutrition Paper 64. Rome, Italy: FAO. 
Helpman, E., M. Melitz, and Y. Rubinstein. 2008. “Trading Partners and Trading Volume.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 123 (2): 441–487. 
Laird, S., and A. Yeats. 1990. Quantitative Methods for Trade-Barrier Analysis. Macmillan Press. 
Manova, K. 2006. Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade. Working Paper 14531. 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Maskus, K. E., J. S. Wilson, and T. Otsuki. 2001. “An Empirical Framework for Analyzing Technical Regulations 
and Trade.” In Quantifying Trade Effect of Technical Barriers: Can It Be Done?, edited by K. E. Maskus 
and J. S. Wilson, 29-58. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Melitz, M. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.” 
Econometrica 71: 1695–1725. 
Moenius, J. 2004. Information versus Product Adaptation: The Role of Standards in Trade. International Business 
and Markets Research Center Working Paper 1. Chicago, IL: Northwestern University.   
18 
________. 2006. “The Good, the Bad and the Ambiguous: Standards and Trade in Agricultural Products.” Paper 
presented at the IATRC Summer Symposium Food Regulation and Trade: Institutional Framework, 
Concepts of Analysis and Empirical Evidence.” Bonn, Germany, May 28–30. 
Otsuki, T., J. S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh. 2001a. “Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the Trade Effect of 
European Food Safety Standards on African Exports.” Food Policy 26 (5): 495–514.  
________. 2001b. “What Price Precaution? European Harmonization of Aflatoxin Regulation and African 
Groundnut Exports.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 28 (3): 263–284. 
Roemer, P. 1994. “New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions.” Journal of Development 
Economics 43 (1): 5–38. 
Scholthof, K. B. G. 2004. “One Foot in the Furrow: Linkages between Agriculture, Plant Pathology and Public 
Health.” Annual Review of Public Health 24: 153–174. 
Shepherd, B. 2007. Product Standards, Harmonization, and Trade: Evidence from the Extensive Margin. Policy 
Research Working Paper 4390. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Tangthirasunan, T. 1998. “Mycotoxin Economic Aspects.” In Mycotoxin Prevention and Control in Food Grains, 
edited by Semple, R L, Frio A S, P A Hicks and J V Lozare Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. Accessed March 8, 2010. www.fao.org/inpho/vlibrary/x0036e/X0036E0a.htm. 
UNCTAD-TRAINS. Trade Analysis and Information Systems. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Accessed November 2010. 
World Development Indicators 2010. The World Bank Washington DC. Accessed December 2010.  
Wu, F., and W. Bryden. 2009. “Mycotoxins: Detection Methods, Management, Public Health and Agricultural 
Trade (book review).” World Mycotoxin Journal 2: 105-107. 
Wu, F. 2008. “A Tale of Two Commodities: How EU Mycotoxin Regulations Have Affected Food Industries.” 




RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
1139.  Climate change and floods in Yemen: Impacts on food security and options for adaptation. Manfred Wiebelt, Clemens 
Breisinger, Olivier Ecker, Perrihan Al-Riffai, Richard Robertson, and Rainer Thiele, 2011. 
1138.  Unintended effects of urbanization in china: Land use spillovers and soil carbon loss. Man Li, Junjie Wu, and 
Xiangzheng Deng, 2011. 
1137.  A regional computable general equilibrium model for Guatemala: Modeling exogenous shocks and policy alternatives. 
Samuel Morley and Valeria Piñeiro, 2011. 
1136.  Who owns the land?: Perspectives from rural Ugandans and implications for land acquisitions. Allan Bomuhangi, Cheryl 
Doss, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, 2011. 
1135.  Comprehension and risk elicitation in the field: Evidence from rural Senegal. Gary Charness and Angelino Viceisza, 
2011. 
1134.  External shocks and policy alternatives in small open economies: The case of El Salvador. Samuel Morley, Valeria 
Piñeiro, and Sherman Robinson, 2011. 
1133.  How does ownership of farm implements affect investment in other farm implements when farmers’ liquidity constraint is 
relaxed?: Insights from Nigeria. Hiroyuki Takeshima and Sheu Salau, 2011. 
1132.  Poverty reduction in a refugee-hosting economy: A natural experiment. Jean-Francois Maystadt, 2011. 
1131.  Cereal production and technology adoption in Ethiopia. Bingxin Yu, Alejandro Nin-Pratt, José Funes, and Sinafikeh 
Asrat Gemessa, 2011. 
1130.  A dynamic computable general equilibrium model with working capital for Honduras. Samuel Morley, Valeria Piñeiro, 
and Sherman Robinson, 2011. 
1129.  The renewed case for farmers’ cooperatives: Diagnostics and implications from Ghana. Gian Nicola Francesconi and 
Fleur Wouterse, 2011. 
1128.  Understanding the linkage between agricultural productivity and nutrient consumption: Evidence from Uganda. John 
Ulimwengu, Saweda Liverpool-Tasie, Josee Randriamamonjy, and Racha Ramadan, 2011. 
1127.  How prudent are rural households in developing transition economies: Evidence from Zhejiang, China. Ling Jin, Kevin 
Z. Chen, Bingxin Yu, and Zuhui Huang, 2011. 
1126.  Climate risk management through sustainable land management in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ephraim Nkonya, Frank Place, 
John Pender, Majaliwa Mwanjololo, Appollonia Okhimamhe, Edward Kato, Susana Crespo, Jupiter Ndjeunga, and Sibiry 
Traore, 2011. 
1125.  Evaluation of value-added agricultural advisory services: Case study of agriclinics in Southern India. Claire J. 
Glendenning, Kwadwo Asenso-Okyere, and Suresh C. Babu, 2011. 
1124.  Making Agriculture Pro-Nutrition: Opportunities in Tanzania. Olivier Ecker, Athur Mabiso, Adam Kennedy, and 
Xinshen Diao, 2011. 
1123.  Measuring the impacts of global trade reform with optimal aggregators of distortions. David Laborde, Will Martin, and 
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, 2011. 
1122.  Managing future oil revenue in Uganda for agricultural development and poverty reduction: A CGE analysis of 
challenges and options. Manfred Wiebelt, Karl Pauw, John Mary Matovu, Evarist Twimukye, and Todd Benson, 2011. 
1121.  Impacts of an early education intervention on students’ learning achievement: Evidence from the Philippines. Futoshi 
Yamauchi and Yanyan Liu, 2011. 
1120.  Supply and demand for cereals in Nepal, 2010–2030. Sanjay K. Prasad, Hemant Pullabhotla, and A. Ganesh-Kumar, 
2011. 
1119.  Which trade integration scheme can best help Sub-Saharan Africa develop and export more processed agricultural 
goods?. Mathilde Douillet, 2011.  
 




2033 K Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA  
Tel.: +1-202-862-5600 
Fax: +1-202-467-4439 
Email: ifpri@cgiar.org 